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England 1523-1601: the beginnings of marine insurance 
 
Guido Rossi   
 
Extant information about early English marine insurance follows a discontinuous 
trend. It is remarkably scarce until the mid-sixteenth century, when it greatly rises in 
the space of a few years, only to fade again after a few decades, and return to growth 
towards the end of the seventeenth century. After that, plenty of records remain. 
However, this misbehaving trend does not affect our knowledge as much as it would 
appear at first sight. The reason lies in the unparalleled continuity in English 
insurance policies, which remained identical from the 1570s to the policy model 
prescribed in the Marine Insurance Act of 1906 (First Schedule). This makes up, at 
least in part, for the gap in the available evidence during the seventeenth century.  
 
At the same time, and crucially, the continuity of the English policy form encourages 
focus on the short but extremely dense formative period of English insurance, the late 
sixteenth century. During the span of a few decades English insurance customs 
detached themselves from their Italian origins and moved towards Dutch and Flemish 
practices, mainly from Antwerp. The customs were written down after the example of 
Dutch compilations, and the policy model crystallised with the establishment of the 
Assurance Register, held within London’s Royal Exchange. Accordingly, this chapter 
seeks to reconstruct the shift from the Italian legacy to the creation of English marine 
insurance. It explores the origins of the Italian heritage before considering the rupture 
with Italy, the growth of Dutch influence, and the formation of the London insurance 
market. Finally, it seeks to explain the reasons behind the London market’s limited 
early success.  
 
The Italian inheritance 
 
Until the establishment of the Royal Exchange in 1567, merchants active in London 
gathered, twice daily, in Lombard Street. The term ‘Lombard’ originally denoted 
simply ‘Italian’ (or, at least, northern Italian). Whilst elsewhere, such as in northern 
France, the name progressively came to denote moneylenders irrespective of their 
origins, in London it maintained its original connection with Italy. 1  Initially the 
commercial usages applied in Lombard Street, aptly called ‘Lombard Street customs’, 
were a by-product of Italian influence, and insurance was no exception. Most 
historical introductions to English insurance therefore open with the statement that the 
beginnings of London insurance are to be found in Italian insurance custom. This is of 
course true, but it does not add much to our knowledge. The Lombards arrived from 
several Italian regions whose customs differed significantly from each other. 
Especially for maritime commerce, the main Italian nationes were three: the Genoese, 
the Florentines, and the Venetians. The origins of English insurance are probably to 
be traced to one of them, or to their combination. But which Lombard group 
contributed the most to their development?  
 
The earliest evidence of Italian maritime trade with England dates back to the late 
thirteenth century.2 However, the growth of maritime commerce between Italy and 
England was slow. For a long time the bulk of the trade was not direct but mediated, 
mainly via Sluys. Italian merchants typically availed themselves of northern 
shipmasters, usually Dutch or Flemish, who operated small vessels on short routes.3 
2 
 
Progressively, though, the volume of trade grew to the point that larger shipments and 
direct routes became more efficient. During the early fifteenth century Italian 
merchants began to settle at selected points on England’s southern coast. The Cinque 
Ports (especially Sandwich) were strategically placed at the narrowest point of the 
English Channel, and so closest to the Continent, but they were more distant from the 
Mediterranean, and in particular they required crossing the entire, notoriously 
treacherous English Channel. Plymouth, in contrast, allowed the Channel to be 
avoided entirely, but was more distant from the main internal markets. The best 
compromise was found in Southampton, which was close enough to both the Atlantic 
route and the main English markets. While Plymouth and Sandwich remained 
important ports, Southampton soon became by far the most trafficked port for 
international commerce, especially with Italy.  
 
The growth of Southampton played a crucial role in the establishment of insurance in 
England. Unlike other commercial activities, early marine insurance was not a 
lucrative business. As such, insurance remained for the entire late middle ages a side-
activity to maritime trade. Merchants insured only if they were deeply involved in 
such commerce. It is very probable that insurance began to be practised in England (at 
least on a significant and continuative basis) during the early fifteenth century, 
precisely because of the growth of Southampton. With the increase in the number and 
quantity of shipments from England it became more convenient to insure them 
locally, if only because the cargo shipped could be known only at the place of 
departure. It is probably not a coincidence that one of the earliest pieces of evidence 
of Italian insurance policies made in England, that found in the ledgers of the London 
branch of the Borromei Bank, dates to the 1430s.4  
 
The growth of direct shipment between England and the Mediterranean during the 
early fifteenth century saw a clear Genoese predominance among the Italian nations 
engaged in maritime commerce with England. This is reflected in both the number of 
vessels involved, and the amount of merchandise shipped from the country. Genoese 
vessels supporting its commerce with England were at least twice as many as 
Venetian ones,5 while Florentine sea-trade with England was hardly relevant.6 The 
most accurate evidence of the value of Italian exports from England is found in the 
petty customs paid by foreign merchants to export English wool and other 
merchandise. Genoese exports from Southampton for the year 1439-40 were nearly 
fourteen times higher than those of the Florentines and the Venetians combined. The 
Genoese paid £14,035, against £516 paid by the Venetians and £506 by the 
Florentines.7 The situation in Sandwich, the second main international gateway to 
England at the time, was even more favourable to the Genoese. All the three accounts 
for the later subsidy levied in 1452-53, dating from 1455 to 1469, reveal the presence 
only of Genoese merchants, both resident and non-resident.8  
 
The growth of direct trade between England and Italy greatly encouraged insurance. 
This is particularly evident in Genoese records. Until the mid-fourteenth century 
policies for voyages to or from England are attested very sporadically. Towards the 
end of the century their number began to grow,9 until the trade boomed during the 
first half of the fifteenth century.10 This seems important, for soon thereafter the first 
evidence of English merchants’ involvement in insurance begins to appear. What 
exists, however, is mainly indirect evidence, which suggests more of an acquaintance 
with insurance custom than an active role.11 Nonetheless, it is very probable that, by 
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the mid-fifteenth century, English merchants (or at least London merchants) were 
becoming familiar with insurance. In all probability their familiarity with the new 
instrument grew during the late fifteenth century, as the first known policies written in 
English date to the early sixteenth century. The earliest known is of 1523.12 
 
While Italian influence on the beginning of English insurance is extremely probable, 
it is considerably less clear where, specifically, it came from. Italian nations followed 
very different mercantile customs. The preponderance of Genoese maritime 
commerce with England, especially compared with Venetian and Florentine trade, 
would suggest that the earliest influence on English insurance came from Genoa. 
Some indirect confirmations, beyond the sheer volume of trade, point directly to this 
possibility.  
 
Venetian merchants were not as prone to insure as their Genoese counterparts, for 
they were already protected by the muda system, under which the State fleet was 
‘lent’ to the merchants. This convoy system provided sufficient protection of cargoes 
to reduce merchants’ risk aversion, and so decreased their incentives to insure.13 
Further, the fifteenth-century Venetian insurance market suffered from an endemic 
paucity of underwriters, which kept the cost of insurance high. Under many Venetian 
policies of the same period, much of the specified cargo’s value remained uninsured. 
Lastly, but equally significant, Venetian underwriters had a markedly restrictive 
attitude towards the insurance of foreigners.14 
 
Aside from its lower volume of exports from England, Florence had a remarkably 
unfavourable attitude towards the insurance of foreign merchandise, and upheld a 
stringent state monopoly over maritime commerce. Such restrictions were lifted only 
around the mid-fifteenth century. It was only in 1464 that Florence allowed the 
insurance of foreign merchants’ goods laden on foreign vessels, and then only when 
they arrived at or departed from the port of Pisa, the Florentine commercial port of the 
time. Under such conditions Florentine merchants often preferred to insure their 
cargoes in Genoa, even when the merchandise came from Florence itself.15 
  
Genoa, by contrast, had neither Venice’s relatively low volume of insurance, nor the 
Florentine restrictions. On the contrary, it encouraged foreigners to insure, so long as 
they employed Genoese vessels. This of course does not per se prove the Genoese 
influence on the origins of English insurance, but it might suggest it, especially when 
combined with the great volume of Genoese maritime trade with England. What we 
do know is that the evidence attesting to the English merchants’ exposure to insurance 
starts around the mid-fifteenth century, at which time both Genoa’s English trade and 
her insurance there were at their apex.  
 
Genoese primacy of influence was short-lived. The city continued to play a 
preeminent role in European commerce for a long time, and insurance was no 
exception, but the very structure of Genoese insurance policies became increasingly 
less suited to foreigners. The main challenge facing medieval marine risk transfer 
instruments was their usurious nature, since the risk carriers typically advanced trade 
capital, and the risk premium in part comprised interest charges. From at least the 
decretal Naviganti of Pope Gregory IX in 1236, such policies were void. 16  The 
pervasive jurisdiction of ecclesiastical tribunals made the prohibition rather effective, 
and numerous attempts to circumvent it by camouflaging the premium met with 
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dubious success. Eventually, in 1369, Genoa opted for drastic measures, and passed a 
statute prohibiting ecclesiastical jurisdiction in matters of insurance.17 The prohibition 
worked well, but its success meant that Genoese merchants had no incentive to 
develop their policies any further. Elsewhere the mid-fourteenth-century insurance 
policy style, which had evolved with the goal of disguising the premium from the 
ecclesiastical prohibition of usury, progressively gave way to overt insurance. In 
Genoa, however, the statute’s ultimate effect was to halt development of the city’s 
insurance practice, and freeze its peculiar style.18  
 
If Florentine maritime trade with England was slow to build, it gained momentum 
during the late fifteenth century. The first known insurance made by Florentine 
merchants residing in London dates to 1426.19 From the 1430s Florentine merchants 
started to use the same route as the Genoese, concentrating their trade in 
Southampton.20 Initially they may have used Genoese intermediaries, but over the 
turn of a few years their presence in Southampton became more institutionalised,21 
and by the mid-fifteenth century Florence was beginning to catch up with Genoa. This 
development finds some confirmation in the comparison of premium rates for 
voyages on the routes Genoa to England and Pisa to England. The premium in 
Florence was 12 per cent to 15 per cent in c. 1442.22 Ten years later, in 1453-4, 
Genoese insurance policies for the route Genoa to England were made for a premium 
of 8 per cent to 13 per cent.23 The rates were, of course, still considerably higher in 
Florence, but the difference was not so great, especially considering the length of the 
route. Anglo-Florentine maritime relations were growing at fast pace, but in all 
probability Genoese pre-eminence began seriously to be challenged only at the turn of 
the century. 
 
Genoa’s predominance in English trade was closely connected to Southampton. So 
long as Southampton retained its pivotal role in international commerce, the Genoese 
kept their position. However, at the end of the fifteenth century Southampton began to 
give way to London. By the first decades of the sixteenth century improvements in 
shipbuilding and rigging allowed most vessels to navigate the Thames.24 London was 
already the main financial centre in England, and its force of attraction proved 
irresistible to international trade. Ships increasingly called directly at London, thereby 
bypassing Southampton. 25  In the space of a few decades English and foreign 
merchants alike left Southampton, and most of them relocated to the capital. The 
decline of Southampton was swift: by the late 1520s only two foreign merchants, both 
Genoese, are still attested there. 26  The reorganisation of English international 
commerce played significantly to the disadvantage of Genoa. In the space of a few 
decades Genoese maritime trade with England came almost to a halt. Genoese ships 
no longer sailed from England, and English ships now called at Leghorn instead of 
Genoa.27  
 
The shift from Genoa to Florence had significant repercussions on insurances. During 
the same years the volume of insurance underwritten in Florence for voyages to or 
from England grew considerably. Over one hundred such policies from the years 
1520-1527 are preserved.28 Revealingly, the first English Consul in the Mediterranean 
was a Florentine.29 By the 1520s London merchants were insuring directly in Florence 
for voyages to or from the Mediterranean. Some of them were stably based in 
Florence itself, and they are often attested as underwriters of Florentine policies to or 
from England.30 
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The increasing volume of Florentine insurance in England probably played an 
important role in the early development of English insurance policies. Unlike the 
Genoese, who continued to camouflage the premium, Florentine policies were drafted 
openly as early as the end of the fourteenth century. They laid out the main elements 
of the contract in plain words and a simple style, thus providing a straightforward 
model to imitate. The known English policies written in the first few decades of the 
sixteenth century are too few in number and too succinct in style to argue for a clear 
derivation from the Florentine model, but if we look at the late sixteenth century, by 
which time they become as numerous as stylistically consistent, the similarity with 
Florence is remarkable, and has been noted by many scholars.31 Thus, while it is 
likely that English merchants made their first acquaintance with insurance via the 
Genoese, it would seem probable that the main influence on the development of 
English insurance customs came from Florence. 
 
The emergence of distinctive London insurance 
 
The increasing concentration of maritime commerce in London provided the missing 
element to the development of a local insurance market. London was already 
England’s main financial centre; now it became also one of its major gateways for 
international maritime trade. By 1561 some 327 English merchants were trading in 
London.32 Not all the Italians active in Southampton relocated there, and many left 
England for good. The increasing number of local merchants, coupled with a 
significant reduction in the number of Italians, entailed the progressive substitution of 
Italian with English capital to finance insurance underwriting. A rising number of 
English merchants began to invest part of their capital in the insurance business.  
 
By the mid-sixteenth century English merchants involved in insurance vastly 
outnumbered foreigners. It was then that the first two elements of a properly English 
insurance ‘type’ began to appear: native language and local brokerage. Extant policies 
issued before the 1540s are written in Italian, but most of the underwritings are in 
English.33 In all probability the nationality of the underwriters was a decisive element 
in the shift of language, which took place soon thereafter. Four out of five known 
surviving policies issued in the 1550s were written in English,34 and by the 1560s it 
was the default language of both policies and signings. Foreign insurers on the known 
policies of the time were so few that no broker could have relied on them for his 
clients. This was probably a decisive factor in the shift from foreign to local 
brokerage. Until the mid-sixteenth century broking remained in the hands of a few 
foreigners, probably Italians,35 while English or ‘common’ brokers were prohibited 
from dealing in insurance.36 Over a few years this changed altogether, and by the 
early 1570s the common brokers were routinely arranging insurance cover.37  
 
The decline of Italian influence on the English insurance market coincided with the 
rise of the Dutch. Over a few decades Dutch and Flemish merchants operating in 
London grew in number as much as in business volume. In 1567 the Dutchmen in 
London already numbered more than 2,000, and their volume of trade with England 
far exceeded that of the Italians.38 Their ascendance was also visible in brokerage: the 
Dutch natio was the only one having two official ‘foreign brokers’ in London, 
whereas all Italian main groups, previously represented with three to five brokers per 
natio, now had just one ‘foreign broker’ each.39  
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Italian brokers operating in London decreased in number both because of the 
dwindling population of their countrymen in England, and in consequence of the 
decline of maritime trade between England and the Mediterranean. While Italian 
maritime commerce with England was decreasing, English trade with Italy ceased 
almost altogether between the 1550s and the 1570s, and English vessels virtually 
abandoned the Mediterranean.40 The increase in Anglo-Dutch maritime trade thus 
occurred at a most propitious time to supplant the old Italian influence. Expanding 
volumes of trade with Dutch and Flemish centres had a crucial impact on insurance. 
In the mid-sixteenth century maritime commerce was still the main vehicle through 
which insurance customs were spread. Antwerp, the main commercial centre of 
northern Europe, was also its main insurance market. Its insurance customs were thus 
able to exert their influence on the young London market, just as the city’s historical 
link with the Italians was becoming increasingly loose.  
 
The customs of Antwerp spread rapidly in England because of both the increase in 
trade, and their inherent qualities. By the mid-sixteenth century Italian insurance 
custom had already been developing for centuries, thus reaching a relatively mature 
stage. This was an obstacle to further change. Antwerp’s insurance market was 
comparatively young, and its swift expansion was attracting merchants from different 
regions. In the space of a few decades a number of divergent customs and policy 
styles was being used in the same place. Antwerp was thus a thriving if somewhat 
chaotic insurance centre where merchants could chose between different and 
competing usages. 41  In this scenario, the most efficient customs progressively 
imposed themselves over others. In turn, strong connections with England ensured the 
rapid spreading of such customs to London, at the very moment when the ‘old guard’ 
was being replaced by new, local brokers, and the language of the policy was moving 
from Italian to English. It is hard to imagine a more favourable time for change. 
London’s insurance market was only beginning to develop a properly ‘local’ set of 
customary insurance rules, and was therefore particularly receptive to innovations. 
One of most important, for example, was the clause ‘to whomsoever it may pertain’, 
which allowed the insurance of merchandise without specifying its ownership.42 
 
While commerce was the main cause of the Low Countries’ influence on English 
insurance, it was not the only one. Religious differences also played an important 
role. Dutch merchants shared the same feelings about popish Italians as their English 
counterparts. Mistrust, disfavour, and sometimes open ostracism of Catholic 
merchants in the late sixteenth century London mercantile community is often 
overlooked, and largely under-researched. Yet it played a role more significant than is 
often assumed in severing the last few links between English and Italian insurance 
custom. During the 1570s, for instance, each of the most important Italian merchants 
still active in London – Genoese Benedict Spinola, Florentine Philip Corsini, and 
Lucchese Acerbo Velutelli – faced temporary imprisonment (albeit on different 
occasions) for minor charges, probably fabricated.43 
 
Institutional instability 
 
With Italian dominance fading away, the increasingly strong influence of Dutch 
custom, and the rising number of English underwriters, the London market underwent 
a period of swift development. Smooth transitional phases in customary law, 
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however, require institutional stability. This was utterly lacking in mid-sixteenth 
century London. The moment that English merchants began to take an interest in the 
insurance business, so too did English law courts. Over the turn of a few decades the 
courts of Admiralty, Chancery, and King’s Bench all laid claim to jurisdiction over 
insurance matters. Turning to a law court was not the usual mercantile practice; 
arbitration was largely considered the proper course for a merchant, in London as 
elsewhere. Because arbitration panels comprised merchants, the subject matter 
remained within a well-defined circle of peers who shared the same usages. 
 
Reputation incentives work better in closed systems, where one has little alternative 
but to abide by the social rules, so to preserve one’s status and remain within the 
system. When the number of investors grows, new players enter the system. While a 
relatively low number of new players may be easily absorbed, the swift entry of a 
large number creates serious difficulties to the preservation of the system. The best 
way to maintain it is to adopt dispute resolution mechanisms which preserve the 
cohesion of the weakened system.44 So, for instance, when Amsterdam took the place 
of Antwerp as the Low Countries’ leading centre of trade, it soon proceeded with the 
establishment of an Insurance Chamber.45  
 
By contrast, if the growth of players is accompanied by a similar increase in the 
number of different institutions all equally able to pronounce upon a dispute, the 
system is further weakened. This was happening in London. A vast number of English 
merchants quickly took an interest in underwriting, entering a circle of investors 
which had been relatively narrow so far. Their inflated number soon attracted the 
attention of several law courts, all equally interested in carving out a share of the new 
and lucrative business.  
 
Of forty surviving policies underwritten by 246 individuals in the years 1573 to 
1593, 46  nine carry the names of foreigners, an insignificant proportion. A large 
majority of the insurers (165) underwrote only one policy; a relevant number, 31 
underwrote two. Only another 31 underwrote more than five of the known policies, 
and among them many insured in their name and in the name of their business 
partners, or on the behalf of someone else, typically another English merchant. 
 
These data suggest a very open insurance market, consisting mainly of occasional 
investors placing one-off bets, and often not trying their luck again, or not for a long 
time. When a ship arrives safely at its destination, the insurers ‘never offer money 
again’, complained a merchant in the 1570s.47 Under such conditions social cohesion 
becomes progressively loose, and reputational incentives increasingly weaker. The 
temptation to plea before a law court, where lengthy procedure and formalism could 
easily be played to one’s advantage, was often hard to resist, especially when the 
investor was not planning to underwrite again, and so did not need to build or 
maintain his reputation.  
 
Pleadings before law courts became increasingly frequent from the mid-sixteenth 
century, and the High Court of Admiralty in particular attracted a growing number of 
cases. Roman law (applied in Admiralty) had some connections to insurance, but was 
not entirely suited to it. The main advantage of pleading before the Admiralty was the 
lengthy process. Suits in the Admiralty could take years, and in the meantime the 
insured was often forced to accept a transaction for just a part of his credit. From a 
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merchant’s point of view this was tantamount to cheating, but again, reputational 
incentives were of little interest to occasional investors. The London mercantile 
community was faced with a twofold issue: furthering certainty in the rules applicable 
to insurance, and resisting centrifugal tendencies on matters of jurisdiction.  
 
The answer came in the late 1570s and early 1580s through the codification of 
insurance customs and the establishment of an insurance registry on the one side, and 
the establishment of a specialised insurance court on the other.48 The insurance court 
was meant chiefly to stop the interference of law courts in marine insurance matters, 
and to bestow some cohesion upon an increasingly chaotic market. The registry would 
curb fraud and assist in the implementation of the body of rules, which in turn would 
ensure uniformity in the interpretation of insurance policies.49 A further (and perhaps 
unforeseen) consequence of the insurance registry was that it contributed greatly to 
the uniformity of the wording of English policies. The language of policies was soon 
frozen, and did not undergo any significant change until the twentieth century. If the 
reference in policies to the customs of Lombard Street made little sense in nineteenth 
century London, it was even less helpful in eighteenth century American policies. In 
both cases, however, it was testament to the strength of tradition.  
 
Early London insurance market: a limited success 
 
The measures taken on both institutional and normative levels restored some degree 
of order and homogeneity to the London insurance market and its practice, at least for 
a period. Surviving evidence shows considerably fewer insurance disputes before the 
courts of law in the 1580s than previously, a probable sign that the newly established 
insurance court was functioning well. Premium rates remained low. On the London to 
Leghorn route, for example, the rate was 7% in 1582,50 peaking at 8% towards the 
end of the year.51 By 1584-85 it was stable at 6%.52 The registry office was also 
operating (all the figures above come from registered policies), and probably 
functioned well enough. The Registrar, Richard Candler, was a teller of the 
Exchequer who had been dismissed from office in 1571 for converting the enormous 
sum of £4,618 to his own personal use.53 In 1597, having run the insurance register 
for over twenty years, Candler was able to return the entire amount to the 
Exchequer.54 It is not known whether the registry was a complete success, but at least 
it cannot have been an utter failure.  
 
It is more difficult to evaluate the new insurance code. In the sixteenth century the 
term ‘codification’ was a loose one. Although it seems probable that the code 
received formal sanction from the Crown,55 merchants did not necessarily feel bound 
by it. They might have considered it as providing written evidence of their customs at 
a given moment, and therefore subject to change over time. So, for instance, in 
Adderley v. Symonds, a life insurance case heard at the end of the sixteenth century 
(1599-1601), most of the witnesses deposed against the need to state the furthest point 
of the voyage,56 whereas the insurance code stated the opposite.57 Despite this, the 
code provides precious information about both the specific rules of the London 
market and the overall attitude of the mercantile community towards insurance.  
 
Early modern compilations on commercial rules typically sought to codify the 
applicable customs, while at the same time introducing changes and improvements. 
They did not merely photograph market practice, but sought to enhance it. Looking at 
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the improvements introduced, it is possible to evaluate the aims of the compilation. 
The London insurance code was the product of a very young market which needed 
additional care to develop further. For the compilers of the code, care chiefly meant 
protection of the insurers from fraud by their insureds.  
 
Looking at underwriting trends, the compilers might have had a point. Insurers did not 
seem to follow any long-term strategy. The average underwriter, of limited financial 
means, was in no position to diversify his risk significantly. Without sufficient capital 
to invest in a number of policies, underwriting was necessarily a gamble – as risky as 
it was potentially lucrative. It is not a coincidence that insurance was often associated 
with wagering. Underwriters did not look at statistical probability, but simply reacted 
emotionally to success and misfortune alike. Thus, risk aversion decreased with a 
series of successful voyages (or lucky bets). Sometimes an investor needed a series of 
successful voyages before starting to raise the stakes. For others, one or two safe 
voyages were enough. But most of them shared the same behaviour: the more they 
gained, the more they risked. Conversely, risk aversion greatly increased after a loss, 
and the same insurer typically lowered considerably the amount of further 
underwritings. Again, it was only after another fortunate series of voyages that the 
typical insurer would increase his underwriting once more.58 Confidence is slow to 
build, whereas panic is fast to spread. Since losses were statistically unavoidable, a 
single serious misfortune after a series of successful voyages could well lead to 
significant and sudden contractions in the market.  
 
Early modern insurance markets, however, did not depend entirely on individual risk 
aversion, and of course risk aversion itself did not depend solely on the individual risk 
propensity. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain why some markets prospered 
while others declined, given the overall homogeneity of investment strategies (or the 
lack of them). The reasons are more complex, and are to be found first and foremost 
in the institutional framework of the market, together with its liquidity.  
 
Credit access was crucial when underwriters suffered a loss. The difficulties of the 
Spanish insurance market of Burgos during the 1570s, for instance, turned a serious 
situation into financial ruin for many underwriters, for the impoverished local 
business community could not support their financial needs. 59  Until political and 
military events turned against it, the same did not happen in Antwerp: the market was 
sufficiently liquid, and credit access relatively cheap. This made it safer to invest in a 
policy, for it was easier to limit the consequences of a few losses (though perhaps not 
of a series of catastrophes).60 
 
It is not easy to provide a clear picture of sixteenth-century London credit access, but 
in all probability the market was too young to be sufficiently liquid. This might justify 
the attitude of the insurance code: in the trade-off between supporting potential 
insureds and encouraging potential underwriters, priority had to be given to the latter. 
The markedly pro-insurer attitude of the London insurance code is clearly visible in a 
number of cases. For example, precious cargo could not be insured against barratry, 
nor against detention or arrest in the country of departure. 61  A forfeiture of the 
premium, instead of the customary half of one percent, was applied both in cases of 
the insured’s cancellation of the insured adventure, and when the cargo had 
temporarily to be unladen while he procured a licence to ship it.62 The broker was 
made jointly and severally liable with the insured for the payment of the premium.63 
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Insurers were no longer liable for the insured’s legal expenses incurred to release a 
seized vessel or cargo.64 Trans-shipment of the cargo was encouraged, instead of its 
abandonment to the insurers,65 and the right of abandonment itself was subjected to 
stringent limitations.66 
 
Even more than credit access and market liquidity, the prevailing institutional 
framework seems to have played a crucial role in early insurance markets. Scholarly 
analysis of institutional structures often focuses on the larger picture, and perhaps it 
works well on a macro level, but the historical development of early markets was 
typically a product of local circumstances, dictated more by power relations between 
different groups than by abstract economic and political considerations. With the 
Pragmática Real of 30 April 1562, for instance, the Spanish crown prohibited 
insurance against pirates. The rationale behind the prohibition was to encourage 
shipmasters to fight on, instead of surrendering without much resistance. If insurance 
encourages moral hazard, narrowing the scope of insurance necessarily reduces it, but 
it is highly doubtful whether merchants would have agreed upon the opportunity of 
such a draconian rule. 67  The emphasis on the relationship between government 
accountability and economic progress, argued by scholars such as Douglass North, is 
not entirely applicable in an early modern context, for it presupposes powerful and 
highly centralised governments. The prohibition of insuring against piracy was 
enacted in Spain, but not in England, primarily because the King of Spain was in a 
position to impose it, while the Queen of England was not.   
 
Decisions by governments, even by those which relied on mercantile support, could 
have disastrous impacts on the insurance market. Such is the case of the Republic of 
Venice, which avoided significant interventions in maritime commerce until its 
decline became all too apparent. Only then did it begin to enact a series of measures 
as protectionist as they were anachronistic. One such measure, in 1586, was the 
prohibition of insurance on foreign vessels. 68  The prohibition clearly did not 
encourage insurance, and was probably aimed more at protecting domestic sea 
carriage than at defending the insurance market.  
 
The English government did not take any such direct approach. Rather, it sought to 
encourage the establishment of local institutions to foster its main insurance market, 
located in London. The coordinated effort leading to the establishment of the 
insurance court, register, and code was as much the product of the Aldermen’s Court 
of London as the Queen’s Privy Council. The Aldermen’s Court was the driving force 
behind the innovations, but the Privy Council’s support was crucial in overcoming the 
resistance of some interest groups. The indirect approach of the English government 
might have been more productive than a more interventionist attitude, but this does 
not necessarily mean that the choice was a deliberate one. It is also possible (indeed, 
even probable) that the government could not go beyond that.  
 
Doubtless the institutional reforms were beneficial to the London insurance market, 
but in the long run they did not yield the desired effects. The main shortcoming 
remained the lack of coordination with other institutions. The insurance court might 
have furthered cohesion among merchants, but it lacked exclusive jurisdiction over 
marine insurance disputes. Effectively, it relied on spontaneous cooperation. The 
system operated for a few years only before a statute was needed, in 1601, to impose 
its jurisdiction forcibly (43 Eliz. c. 12). The scope of the statute, however, was 
11 
 
progressively eroded by common law Courts.69 More than anything else, it was the 
absence of an exclusive jurisdictional forum for insurance disputes that hindered the 
formation of a homogeneous, close-knit group. This in turn had serious consequences 
on the substantive rules, as well as on the overall success of the insurance market 
itself.  
 
Customary rules are the product of social groups, and thus require a homogeneous 
group to underpin them. The absence of a single court weakened insurance rules both 
directly and indirectly. Directly, they were not applicable before common law courts. 
The King’s Bench, for example, analysed the insurance contract in terms of assumpsit 
(an action for recovery of damages following a breach of contract); it is difficult to 
think of anything less compatible with insurance customs than that. Indirectly, 
jJurisdictional plurality acted as a powerful centrifugal force on merchants. Weaker 
social cohesion, in turn, had a negative impact on the applicability of mercantile 
usages. Even if such practices were now written down, they were still considered 
customs: their effective application depended on the community that used them. 
 
The poor reliability of London insurers during the formative period of English 
insurance century is thus probably to be ascribed to the institutional environment. The 
single underwriter might be trusted, but not the underwriters as a group: they had no 
clear incentives to act as such. Ultimately the success of English insurance depended 
considerably upon the certainty of the applicable rules, but such certainty was 
achieved only after the common law managed fully to absorb insurance litigation 
during the eighteenth century. Thus, the growing autonomy of the judiciary ultimately 
slowed down the growth of the insurance market, instead of furthering it – but this 
could hardly be imputed to the government.  
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